본문바로가기 푸터바로가기

한국농촌경제연구원 로고

  1. ENG
  3. 사이트맵 열기

    한국농촌경제연구원 로고

    ENG
    사이트맵 끄기
  4. 메뉴열기
메인으로 이동

농촌경제

Relational Contracts in Moral Hazard with Subjective Performance Measures

2007.05.01 11161
연구보고서 표지
  • 저자
    이명기
  • 등록일
    2007.05.01
  • 연구주제
    농업정책일반.
원문보기
목차

I. Introduction
II. Model Assumptions
III. Optimal Termination Contracts
IV. Conclusion and Implication

요약문

This paper analyzes optimal self-enforcing termination contracts under the assumptions that the agent (e.g. grower) must make relationship-specific investments prior to contracting, that the principal (e.g. integrator or processor) has ex post full bargaining power due to monopsony power, and that performance is subjectively measured. In the optimal self-enforcing termination contract, the principal motivates the agent by rewarding the agent through continuation of the relationship for high levels of performance and penalizes the agent through termination for low levels of performance. Performance bonuses are no longer used. When the agent must make relationship-specific investment, the principal may not pay positive rents. This implies that the relationship-specificity of investment increases the principal's expected payoff, whereas it decreases the agent's.

This paper analyzes optimal self-enforcing termination contracts under the assumptions that the agent (e.g. grower) must make relationship-specific investments prior to contracting, that the principal (e.g. integrator or processor) has ex post full bargaining power due to monopsony power, and that performance is subjectively measured. In the optimal self-enforcing termination contract, the principal motivates the agent by rewarding the agent through continuation of the relationship for high levels of performance and penalizes the agent through termination for low levels of performance. Performance bonuses are no longer used. When the agent must make relationship-specific investment, the principal may not pay positive rents. This implies that the relationship-specificity of investment increases the principal's expected payoff, whereas it decreases the agent's.

저자정보
이명기Lee, Myeongki
선임연구위원
소속: 농업재정금융연구실
저자의 다른 보고서
저자에게 문의
이명기Lee, Myeongki
선임연구위원
소속: 농업재정금융연구실
저자에게 문의
구매안내

KREI의 출판물은 판매 대행사 (정부간행물판매센터)와 아래 서점에서 구입 하실 수 있습니다.

판매대행사
(주)정부간행물판매센터 http://www.gpcbooks.co.kr
서울특별시 중구태평로 1가 25번지
TEL02)394-0337, 734-6818 FAX 02) 394-0339
판매서점
농촌경제연구원 cctv 설치현황
교보문고 http://www.kyobobook.co.kr
영풍문고 http://www.ypbooks.co.kr
알라딘 http://www.aladin.co.kr
  • 상세정보 조회
    11161
  • 다운로드
    8

같은 분야 보고서

같은 분야 보고서가 없습니다.

목록으로
다음글
Advancement of Agro-food Safety System in Korea
이전글
Economic Effects of Environmental Taxation on Chemical Fertilizers in Korea